Offense	STATUTE	CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE (CIMT)?	AGGRAVATED FELONY?	OTHER GROUNDS OF DEPORTABILITY OR INADMISSIBILITY? <sup>1</sup>	COMMENTS AND PRACTICE TIPS
Prostitution, commercial sexual conduct, commercial exploitation of a minor	18.2- 346.01	Yes	Possibly, under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(K)(i) if the offense relates to "owning, controlling, managing, or supervising a prostitution business" or (K)(ii) if relating to transporting persons for the purpose of	Probably, under the prostitution and commercialized vice grounds of inadmissibility at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(2)(D) Possibly, as a crime of child abuse under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) if prostitution solicited from a minor	Consider alternative pleas to 18.2- 415 (disorderly conduct) or 18.2- 427 (use of profane language or making obscene proposal) to avoid the CIMT, prostitution-related, and crime of child abuse -related grounds of removal To avoid sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony, ensure that age of solicited individual is left out of the record of conviction; if crime is of solicitation, seek conviction under 18.2-346(B), not (B)(i) or (B)(ii).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Including, but not limited to: controlled substance offense, prostitution offense, commercialized vice offense, firearm offense, crimes of domestic violence, crimes of stalking, and crimes against children.

prostitution to obtain commercial advantage <sup>2</sup>	
Possibly, under "sexual abuse of a minor" grounds at U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) if convicted under 18.2-346(i) or (ii)	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> *Matter of Ding*, 27 I&N Dec. 295 (BIA 2018) held that "for purposes of section 101(a)(43)(K)(i) of the Act, we now hold that the term "prostitution" is not limited to offenses involving sexual intercourse but is defined as engaging in, or agreeing or offering to engage in, sexual conduct for anything of value. This definition is similar to the "[a]ct of performing, or offering or agreeing to perform a sexual act for hire," as Black's Law Dictionary 1222 (6th ed. 1990) defined "prostitution" when section 101(a)(43)(K)(i) was enacted. Please note that in *Matter of Gertsenshteyn*, 24 I&N Dec. 111 (BIA 2007), the BIA held that "The categorical approach to determining whether a criminal offense satisfies a particular ground of removal does not apply to the inquiry whether a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a) was committed for "commercial advantage" and thus, this statute qualifies as an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(K)(ii) of the INA, where "commercial advantage" is not an element of the offense was committed for "commercial advantage" where it was evident from the record of proceeding, including the respondent's testimony, that he knew that his employment activity was designed to create a profit for the prostitution business for which he worked.

Keeping, residing in, or frequenting a bawdy house	18.2-347	Yes <sup>3</sup>	Possibly, under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(K)(i) if the offense relates to "owning, controlling, managing, or supervising a prostitution business" or (K)(ii) if relating to transporting persons for the purpose of prostitution to obtain commercial advantage <sup>4</sup>	Probably, under the prostitution and commercialized vice grounds of inadmissibility at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(2)(D) Possibly, as a crime of child abuse under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) if prostitution solicited from a minor	Consider alternative pleas to 18.2- 415 (disorderly conduct) or 18.2- 427 (use of profane language or making obscene proposal) to avoid the CIMT, prostitution-related, and crime of child abuse -related grounds of removal
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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Please note that under *Belcher v. Commonwealth*, S.E.2d 2022 WL 4472825 (September 27, 2022), Class 1 misdemeanor in VA is not equivalent to "1 year." As such, those sentenced to Class 1 misdemeanor under this statute could avail themselves of the "petty offense" exception under 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> An immigration practitioner should challenge the aggravated felony ground of removability by arguing that "bawdy place" and "immoral purposes" are overbroad under Virginia case law. *See Hensley v. City of Norfolk*, 218 S.E.2d 735, 740 (Va. 1975)(lewdness and assignation therefore do not inherently relate to prostitution, making "bawdy place" as an element overly broad). *See also Cmmw. v. Croatan Books, Inc.*, 323 S.E.2d 86, 87–88, 90 (Va. 1984); *Warshaw v. City of Norfolk*, 58 S.E.2d 884, 885 (Va. 1950). In *Matter of Ding*, 27 I&N Dec. 295 (BIA 2018), the BIA analyzed a

Aiding in Prostitution	18.2-348	Yes	Probably, under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(K)(i) if the offense relates to "owning, controlling, managing, or supervising a prostitution business" or (K)(ii) if relating to transporting persons for the purpose of prostitution to obtain commercial advantage	Probably, under the prostitution and commercialized vice grounds of inadmissibility at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(2)(D) Possibly, as a crime of child abuse under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) if prostitution solicited from a minor	Consider alternative pleas to 18.2- 415 (disorderly conduct) or 18.2- 427 (use of profane language or making obscene proposal) to avoid the CIMT, prostitution-related, and crime of child abuse -related grounds of removal
			Possibly, under "sexual abuse of a		

Wisconsin statute and held that 101(a)(43)(K)(i) of the Act is not limited to offenses involving sexual intercourse for hire. Rather, it encompasses offenses relating to the operation of a business that involves engaging in, or agreeing or offering to engage in, sexual conduct for anything of value. Consequently, the BIA concluded that the respondent's conviction for keeping a place of prostitution in violation of section 944.34(1) of the Wisconsin Statute was categorically for an aggravated felony and renders the respondent removable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act."

<sup>\*\*</sup>This chart only analyzes whether convictions may fall within the primary categories of removability set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act. Defenders should remember that it is also important to analyze whether a conviction leads to other immigration consequences, such as ineligibility for certain forms of relief from removal, Temporary Protected Status, naturalization, or Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals. Please review the Cover Memorandum and relevant Practice Advisories on our website.\*\*

			minor" grounds at U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) if convicted under 18.2-348 with reference to 18.2- 361(B)		
Trafficking or taking a person to become a prostitute	18.2-355	Yes	Probably, under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(K)(i) if the offense relates to "owning, controlling, managing, or supervising a prostitution business" or (K)(ii) if relating to transporting persons for the purpose of prostitution to	Probably, under the prostitution and commercialized vice grounds of inadmissibility at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(2)(D) Possibly, as a crime of child abuse under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) if prostitution solicited from a minor	Consider alternative pleas to 18.2- 415 (disorderly conduct) or 18.2- 427 (use of profane language or making obscene proposal) to avoid the CIMT, prostitution-related, and crime of child abuse -related grounds of removal

			obtain commercial advantage Possibly, under "sexual abuse of a minor" grounds at U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) if convicted under 18.2-355(3)		
Receive money to place a prostitute or trafficking	18.2-356	Yes	Probably, under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(K)(i) if the offense relates to "owning, controlling, managing, or supervising a prostitution business" or (K)(ii) if relating to transporting persons for the purpose of	Probably, under the prostitution and commercialized vice grounds of inadmissibility at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(2)(D) Possibly, as a crime of child abuse under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) if prostitution solicited from a minor	Consider alternative pleas to 18.2- 415 (disorderly conduct) or 18.2- 427 (use of profane language or making obscene proposal) to avoid the CIMT, prostitution-related, and crime of child abuse -related grounds of removal

			prostitution to obtain commercial advantage Possibly, under "sexual abuse of a minor" grounds at U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) if convicted under 18.2-356(i); Yes if convicted under 18.2-356(ii)		
Receive money from earnings of prostitute	18.2-357	Yes	Probably, under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(K)(i) if the offense relates to "owning, controlling, managing, or supervising a prostitution business" or (K)(ii) if relating	Probably, under the prostitution and commercialized vice grounds of inadmissibility at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(2)(D) Possibly, as a crime of child abuse under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) if	Consider alternative pleas to 18.2- 415 (disorderly conduct) or 18.2- 427 (use of profane language or making obscene proposal) to avoid the CIMT, prostitution-related, and crime of child abuse -related grounds of removal

Commercial	18.2-357.1	Yes	to transporting persons for the purpose of prostitution to obtain commercial advantage Yes, under 8 U.S.C.	prostitution solicited from a minor Probably, under the	Consider alternative pleas to 18.2-
sex trafficking			§ 1101(a)(43)(K)(i) if the offense relates to "owning, controlling, managing, or supervising a prostitution business" or (K)(ii) if relating to transporting persons for the purpose of prostitution to obtain commercial advantage	prostitution and commercialized vice grounds of inadmissibility at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(2)(D) Possibly, as a crime of child abuse under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) if prostitution solicited from a minor	415 (disorderly conduct) or 18.2- 427 (use of profane language or making obscene proposal) to avoid the CIMT, prostitution-related, and crime of child abuse grounds of removal

Taking	18.2-370	Yes	Yes, under the	Probably a crime of	Seek alternative plea to simple
indecent			"sexual abuse of a	child abuse under 8	assault 18.2-57; if this is not
liberties with			minor" grounds at	U.S.C. §	possible consider an alternative plea
children			8 U.S.C. §	1227(a)(2)(E) <sup>6</sup>	to 18.2-371(i) contributing to the
			1101(a)(43)(A) <sup>5</sup>		delinquency of a minor and specify
					subsection (i) in the record – note
					that this will likely avoid the CIMT
					and aggravated felony grounds but
					may not avoid the crime of child
					abuse grounds of deportability <sup>7</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals determined this offense to constitute sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony in an unpublished decision in 2008, *Waffi v. Mukasey*, 285 Fed. Appx. 26 (4th Cir. 2008). Generally, the Fourth Circuit has defined "sexual abuse of a minor" in the sentencing context as "physical or non-physical misuse or maltreatment of a minor for a purpose associated with sexual gratification." *U.S. v. Diaz-Ibarra*, 522 F.3d 343, 352 (4th Cir. 2008); *U.S. v. Cabrera-Umanzor*, 728 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 2013).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The "crime of child abuse" ground of deportability at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) has been defined broadly by the Board of Immigration Appeals, requiring the elements of a knowing mental state, coupled with an act or acts of creating a likelihood of harm to a child. *See Matter of Mendoza-Osoria*, 16 I&N Dec. 703(BIA 2016); see also *Matter of Velasquez-Herrera*, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503 (BIA 2008) (defining crime of child abuse as "any offense involving an intentional, knowing, reckless, or criminally negligent act or omission that constitutes maltreatment of a child or that impairs a child's physical or mental well-being, including sexual abuse or exploitation."). The question on whether Congress intended 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(E)(i) to apply to aliens convicted of an attempt or inchoate offense and whether a strict liability statute can satisfy the BIA's interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) is currently pending before the BIA. *See David Marquez Cruz v. Robert Wilkinson*, No. 20-1529 (4th Cir. 2021). <sup>7</sup> *See supra* note 6.

Indecent	18.2-	Yes <sup>8</sup>	Yes, under the	Probably a crime of	Seek alternative plea to simple
liberties by	370.01		"sexual abuse of a	child abuse under 8	assault 18.2-57; if this is not
children;			minor" grounds at	U.S.C. §	possible consider an alternative plea
penalty.			8 U.S.C. §	1227(a)(2)(E) <sup>10</sup>	to 18.2-371(i) contributing to the
			1101(a)(43)(A) <sup>9</sup>		delinquency of a minor and specify
					subsection (i) in the record – note
					that this will likely avoid the CIMT
					and aggravated felony grounds but
					may not avoid the crime of child
					abuse grounds of deportability.
					Also check if this is the ONLY
					conviction for a client as it may
					qualify for CIMT exceptions under
					212 inadmissibility grounds, but
					may not waive deportability
					grounds under 237(a)(2)(E)(i).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Please note that if this is the ONLY conviction, check CIMT exceptions under 212(a)(2): if the crime was convicted when the person was under 18 AND the crime was committed more than 5 years before the date of application 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I). Additionally, please note that under *Belcher v. Commonwealth*, S.E.2d 2022 WL 4472825 (September 27, 2022), Class 1 misdemeanor in VA is not equivalent to "1 year." As such, those sentenced to Class 1 misdemeanor under this statute could avail themselves of the "petty offense" exception under 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II).

<sup>10</sup> See supra note 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> See supra note 5.

Sex offenses	18.2-370.2	Yes	Likely not, but the	Possibly, if this is the	In the record, attempt to specify that
prohibiting			underlying sex	second CIMT under 8	there was no incidences of child
proximity to			offense will	U.S.C. §	abuse in connection with the
children;			presumably	1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).	violation of this statute
penalty			qualify		
				Possibly a crime	
				against children	
				under 8 U.S.C. §	
				1227(a)(2)(E)	
Sex offenses	18.2-370.3	Yes	Likely not, but the	Possibly, if this is the	In the record, attempt to specify that
prohibiting			underlying sex	second CIMT under 8	there was no incidences of child
residing in			offense will	U.S.C. §	abuse in connection with the
proximity to			presumably	1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).	violation of this statute
children;			qualify		
penalty.				Possibly a crime	
				against children	
				under 8 U.S.C. §	
				1227(a)(2)(E)	
Sex offenses	18.2-370.4	Yes	Likely not, but the	Possibly, if this is the	In the record, attempt to specify that
prohibiting			underlying sex	second CIMT under 8	there was no incidences of child
working on			offense will	U.S.C. §	abuse in connection with the
school			presumably	1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).	violation of this statute
			qualify		

property; penalty				Possibly a crime against children under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)	
Sex offenses prohibiting entry onto school or other property; penalty	18.2-370.5	Yes	Likely not, but the underlying sex offense will presumably qualify	Possibly, if this is the second CIMT under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). Possibly a crime against children under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)	In the record, attempt to specify that there was no incidences of child abuse in connection with the violation of this statute
Penetration of mouth of child with lascivious intent; penalty	18.2-370.6	Yes	Yes, under the "sexual abuse of a minor" grounds at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) <sup>11</sup>	Probably a crime of child abuse under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) <sup>12</sup>	Seek alternative plea to simple assault 18.2-57; if this is not possible consider an alternative plea to 18.2-371(i) contributing to the delinquency of a minor and specify subsection (i) in the record – note that this will likely avoid the CIMT and aggravated felony grounds but

<sup>11</sup> See supra note 5.

<sup>12</sup> See supra note 6

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					may not avoid the crime of child abuse grounds of deportability
Contributing	18.2-371	No if convicted	No <sup>14</sup>	Probably a crime of	Plead to subsection (i) rather than
to		under		child abuse under 8	(ii) and ensure that the record of
delinquency		subsection (i);		U.S.C.	conviction demonstrates as much;
of a minor		possibly if		1227(a)(2)(E)(i) <sup>15</sup>	note that this will likely avoid the
		convicted			CIMT and aggravated felony
		under			grounds but may not avoid the
		subsection			crime of child abuse grounds of
		(ii) <sup>13</sup>			deportability <sup>16</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> See Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. 2012) (determining the first subsection to include conduct that is not turpitudinous but finding the second subsection to be categorically a CIMT, and looking to the record of conviction to determine under which subsection the respondent was convicted).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Subsection (ii) of 18.2-371 criminalizes consensual sex acts performed by a person 18 years or older with a person 15 years or older. This provision encompasses offenses colloquially referred to as "statutory rape." Looking at a similar statutory rape statute in California, the U.S. Supreme Court found that, because the least of the acts criminalized under the statute would be consensual sex between a victim almost 18 and a perpetrator just turned 21, the statute was categorically overbroad and did not constitute sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). *Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions*, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017). In the case of subsection (ii) of 18.2-371, the least of the acts criminalized by the statute would be consensual sex between a victim of 17 years of age and a perpetrator of 18 years of age. Therefore, under the logic of *Esquivel-Quintana*, 18.2-371 is categorically not a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> See supra note 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> See supra note 6.

Abuse and	18.2-	Probably not <sup>17</sup>	Possibly, under 8	Yes, crime related to	Seek alternative plea to simple
neglect of	371.1(A)		U.S.C. §	child abuse ground of	assault 18.2-57; if this is not
children;			1101(a)(43)(F) if	deportability at 8	possible consider an alternative
penalty;			sentence imposed	U.S.C. §	plea to 18.2-371(i) contributing to
abandoned			is at least one	1227(a)(2)(E) <sup>19</sup>	the delinquency of a minor, and
infant			year <sup>18</sup>		specify subsection (i) in the record
			Maybe, under 8 U.S.C. §		– note that this will likely avoid the CIMT and aggravated felony

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> An immigration practitioner would have a strong argument that this offense is not a CIMT because it includes omissions and negligence. Generally, offenses involving negligence, strict liability, general intent, or intent to break the law are not CIMTs. *See Matter of Ortega-Lopez*, 26 I&N Dec. 99, 100 (BIA 2013). Furthermore, in *Sotnikau v. Lynch*, 846 F.3d 741 (4th Cir. 2017) the Fourth Circuit held that the Virginia involuntary manslaughter statute was categorically overbroad and therefore not a CIMT when it extended to punishing conduct committed through "criminal negligence," which is a *mens rea* lower than specific intent or recklessness and therefore insufficient for a CIMT finding. The same argument could be applied to 18.2-371.1(A).

<sup>19</sup> See supra note 6. Matter of Soram, 25 I&N Dec. 378 (BIA 2010) Interpreted INA § 237(a)(1)(E)(i) to include endangerment within the meaning of "child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment." Limited exception for those endangerment offenses that do not require a "sufficient" "risk of harm." See also Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 2008).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> An immigration practitioner would have a strong argument that this offense does not constitute a crime of violence aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) because the offense may be committed without the use of "force" as defined for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 16, for example through a refusal to act or a reckless disregard for a child's life. Accordingly, an immigration practitioner can argue that the statute is categorically overbroad as to the crime of violence aggravated felony. Furthermore, there is an argument not yet addressed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals that the risk-based element of 18 U.S.C. § 16 is unconstitutional. This is because, as three Circuit Courts of Appeals have found, *Johnson v. United States*, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), a case in which the Supreme Court held the Armed Criminal Career Act ("ACCA") residual clause – a federal statute almost identical to 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) -- is unconstitutionally void for vagueness, compels the conclusion that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is also unconstitutionally void for vagueness. See *United States v. Gregorio Gonzalez-Longoria*, 813 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2015); *United States v. Vivas-Ceja*, 808 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2015); *Dimaya v. Lynch*, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015).

		1101(a)(43)(A) if offense involved sexual abuse		grounds but may not avoid the crime of child abuse grounds of deportability <sup>20</sup>
18.2- 371.1(	B) Yes	Possibly, under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) if sentence imposed is at least one year <sup>21</sup> Maybe, under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) if offense involved sexual abuse	Yes, crime related to child abuse ground of deportability at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) <sup>22</sup>	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> See supra note 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> See supra note 18.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> See supra note 6. Matter of Soram, 25 I&N Dec. 378 (BIA 2010) Interpreted INA § 237(a)(1)(E)(i) to include endangerment within the meaning of "child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment." Limited exception for those endangerment offenses that do not require a "sufficient" "risk of harm." See also Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 2008).

Production,	18.2-374.1	Yes <sup>23</sup>	Probably, under 8	Crime related to child	To preserve an argument that the
publication,			U.S.C. § 1101	abuse ground of	offense is not a sexual abuse of a
sale,			(a)(43)(i) relating	deportability at 8	minor aggravated felony, make
financing,			to child	U.S.C. §	affirmative record of no sexual
etc., of child			pornography <sup>24</sup>	1227(a)(2)(E) <sup>25</sup>	abuse against child
pornography			Maybe, under 8 U.S.C. §	Likely also inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(2)(D)	

<sup>23</sup> See generally Matter of Olquin, 23 I&N Dec. 896 (BIA 2006), holding that the offense of possession of child pornography in violation of section 827.071(5) of the Florida Statutes is a crime involving moral turpitude.

<sup>24</sup> Arguably, this Section is not a categorical match. The relevant federal offense (18 U.S.C. § 2252) and the statute of conviction appear similar in a number of ways: they require actual depictions of a minor, the same level of mens rea, and same definition of minors. There is some overbreadth in that the scope of sexually explicit depictions in the state statute cover non-federal conduct. Unlike the definition of sexually explicit conduct in 18 U.S. Code § 2256, the legal definition of sexual conduct under the Virginia statute punishes, among other things, explicit actual or explicitly simulated acts of homosexuality (quoted term, not endorsing language). *See* VA Code § 18.2-390 (3) and 18 U.S. Code § 2256 (2). The Virginia definition likewise contemplates physical contact which includes an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification with a female breast whereas the federal definition does not. *Id*. Lastly, the Virginia definition of sexually explicit conduct in 18 U.S.C. § 2252, does not include stimulates the virginia definition of sexually explicit conduct in 18 U.S.C. § 2252, does not include depictions of the least two circuits have used the overboard argument: *Salmoran v. Att'y Gen. United States*, 909 F.3d 73, 79 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding a NJ conviction of child pornography to be overbroad because it criminalized visual depictions of the inner thigh, 803 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding a California conviction for possessing child pornography is overbroad because California's definition of depicted sexual conduct is quite broad and not restricted to specific body parts). An attorney can also argue that VA Code § 18.2 374.1 is indivisible.

<sup>25</sup> See supra note 6.

\*\*This chart only analyzes whether convictions may fall within the primary categories of removability set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act. Defenders should remember that it is also important to analyze whether a conviction leads to other immigration consequences, such as ineligibility for certain forms of relief from removal, Temporary Protected Status, naturalization, or Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals. Please review the Cover Memorandum and relevant Practice Advisories on our website.\*\*

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			1101(a)(43)(A) if offense involved sexual abuse	(relating to prostitution and commercialized vice)	
Possession, reproduction, distribution, solicitation, and	18.2- 374.1:1	Yes <sup>26</sup>	Probably, under 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43)(i) relating to child pornography <sup>27</sup>	Crime related to child abuse ground of deportability at 8	To preserve an argument that the offense is not a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony, make affirmative record of no sexual abuse against child

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> *Matter of Olquin*, 23 I&N Dec. 896 (BIA 2006), holding that the offense of possession of child pornography in violation of section 827.071(5) of the Florida Statutes is a crime involving moral turpitude. The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that child pornography is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children because, as a permanent record of a child's abuse, the circulation of child pornography continues to harm the child's reputation and emotional well-being. *Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition*, 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002).

<sup>27</sup> There is an argument to be made that this Section is not a categorical match. The relevant federal offense (18 U.S.C. § 2252) and the statute of conviction appear similar in a number of ways: they require actual depictions of a minor, the same level of mens rea, and same definition of minors. There is some overbreadth in that the scope of sexually explicit depictions in the state statute cover non-federal conduct. Unlike the definition of sexually explicit conduct in 18 U.S. Code § 2256, the legal definition of sexual conduct under the Virginia statute punishes, among other things, explicit actual or explicitly simulated acts of homosexuality (term of art, not endorsing language). *See* VA Code § 18.2-390 (3) and 18 U.S. Code § 2256 (2). The Virginia definition likewise contemplates physical contact which includes an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification with a female breast whereas the federal definition does not. *Id*. Lastly, the Virginia definition of sexually explicit conduct punishes nudity, which includes the exposure of the buttocks and the showing of female breasts with less than a full opaque covering of a portion below the top of the nipple. VA § 18.2-390. The federal definition of sexually explicit conduct in 18 U.S.C. § 2252, does not include depictions of buttocks or the female breasts in the way Virginia does. At least two circuits have used the overboard argument: *Salmoran v. Att'y Gen. United States*, 909 F.3d 73, 79 (3d Cir. 2018)(finding a NJ conviction of child pornography to be overbroad because it criminalized visual depictions of the inner thigh, breasts, or buttocks whereas the federal definition is limited to depictions of the anus, genitals, or pubic area of any person.); *Chavez-Solis v. Lynch*, 803 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2015)(finding a California conviction for possessing child pornography is overbroad because

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facilitation of child pornography			Maybe, under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) if offense involved sexual abuse	U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) <sup>28</sup> Likely also inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(2)(D) (relating to prostitution and commercialized vice)	
Use of	18.2-374.3	Yes <sup>29</sup>	Maybe, under 8	Crime related to child	To preserve an argument that the
communicati			U.S.C. §	abuse ground of	offense is not a sexual abuse of a
ons systems			1101(a)(43)(A) if	deportability at 8	minor aggravated felony, make
to facilitate			offense involved	U.S.C. §	affirmative record of no sexual
certain			sexual abuse <sup>30</sup>	1227(a)(2)(E) <sup>31</sup>	abuse against child
offenses					

California's definition of depicted sexual conduct is quite broad and not restricted to specific body parts). However, VA Code § 18.2 374.1:1 is possibly indivisible.

<sup>28</sup> See supra note 6.

<sup>29</sup> In *Matter of Jimenez-Cedillo*, 27 I&N Dec. 782 (BIA 2020), BIA analyzed a similar MD statute and held that "Sexual solicitation of a minor in violation of section 3-324(b) of the Maryland Criminal Law with the intent to engage in an unlawful sexual offense under section 3-307 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude."

 $^{30}$  The Fourth Circuit affirmed the view that sexual solicitation of minors, without actual contact, was sufficiently serious to constitute sexual abuse of a minor for purposes of the aggravated felony provisions in section 101(a)(43)(A) of the Act. *Thompson v. Barr*, 922 F.3d 528 (4th Cir. 2019). Could also reach out to IRAC for a copy of relevant unpublished BIA decisions, at www.irac.net.

<sup>31</sup> See supra note 6.

involving children	10.2.20(1	<b>D</b> = == 111 22	Ma ha shaq		
Unlawful creation of image of another	18.2-386.1	Possibly <sup>32</sup>	Maybe, under 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43)(i) relating to child pornography Maybe, under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) if offense involved sexual abuse	Possibly, under 8 U.S. C. § 1182 (a)(2)(A)(i)(I) Maybe, under child abuse ground of deportability at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) <sup>33</sup>	Keep any reference of age to offended party out of the record. To preserve an argument that the offense is not a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony, make affirmative record of no sexual abuse against child.

<sup>33</sup> See supra note 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> VA Code § 18.2-386.1(A)(ii) is a CIMT. VA Code § 18.2-386.1(D) could possibly be a CIMT because the intent to achieve an immoral result may be considered inherent in the willful commission of sexual crimes involving young children. *See Matter of Jimenez-Cedillo*, 27 I&N Dec. 782, 793 (BIA 2020). *See also United States v. Malloy*, 568 F.3d 166, 171 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that it does not allow a mistake of age defense); and the Supreme Court has determined that solicitation of child pornography is not constitutionally protected activity. *United States v. Williams*, 553 U.S. 285, 307 (2008); Cf. *Matter of Olquin-Rufino*, 23 I&N Dec. 896, 898 (BIA 2006) (holding that the offense of possession of child pornography in violation of section 827.071(5) of the Florida Statutes is a crime involving moral turpitude). Please note that under *Belcher v. Commonwealth*, S.E.2d 2022 WL 4472825(September 27, 2022), Class 1 misdemeanor in VA is not equivalent to "1 year." As such, those sentenced to Class 1 misdemeanor under this statute could avail themselves of the "petty offense" exception under 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II).

Indecent exposure	18.2-387	Possibly <sup>34</sup>	Maybe, under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) if offense involved sexual abuse of a minor	Crime related to child abuse ground of deportability at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) if it involved a minor	Keep any reference of age to offended party out of the record to avoid child abuse aggravated felony
Obscene sexual	18.2- 387.1 <sup>35</sup>	Yes <sup>36</sup>	Maybe, under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) if offense involved		Consider alternative pleas to 18.2- 415 (disorderly conduct) or 18.2- 427 (use of profane language or

<sup>34</sup> In *Matter of Cortes Medina*, the BIA found that a statute punishing deliberate obscene display required an element of "lewd intent" in order to be a CIMT, meaning exposure "for purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or affront." 26 I&N Dec. 79, 85 (BIA 2013). According to the BIA, this requirement excludes as overbroad statutes that punish mere nudity, for example, or childish insults like mooning. Virginia's indecent exposure statute does not, on the face of the statute, require a "lewd intent." However, it does require an "obscene display or exposure," and in order for something to be found "obscene" the evidence must show a related "prurient interest in sex." *See Hart v. Commonwealth*, 441 S.E.2d 706, 709 (Va. Ct. App. 1994). An immigration practitioner could try to argue that the circumstances in which the Commonwealth has convicted people under Va. Code 18.2-387 go beyond "lewd intent," as Virginia case law shows that there has been a successful conviction under the statute where the perpetrator purposefully exposed his G-string swim suit to an office supply store worker, even though his genitals were covered. *See Id. Matter of Mueller*, 11 I&N Dec. 268 (BIA 1965), the BIA analyzed indecent exposure under Wisconsin law section 944.20(2) and held that it was not a CIMT because it does not require a specific intent or that a violator has a vicious motive or corrupt mind, and can be done carelessly.

<sup>35</sup> In *Copeland v. Commonwealth*, 525 S.E.2d 9, 10 (Va. Ct. App. 2000), the court noted that "[t]o be obscene, conduct must violate contemporary community standards of sexual candor."

<sup>36</sup> See supra note 34. Please note that under *Belcher v. Commonwealth*, S.E.2d 2022 WL 4472825(September 27, 2022), Class 1 misdemeanor in VA is not equivalent to "1 year." As such, those sentenced to Class 1 misdemeanor under this statute could avail themselves of the "petty offense" exception under 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II).

display;			sexual abuse of a		making obscene proposal) to avoid
penalty.			minor		the CIMT grounds of removal
					To preserve an argument that the offense is not an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), make affirmative record that offense did not involve sexual abuse and that no minors were present
Profane swearing or intoxication in public	18.2-388	No	No	No	