Procedural

Holding that (1) non-citizen could not collaterally attack his prior removal order in subsequent illegal reentry criminal proceedings because the conditions prescribed by 8  U.S.C. § 1326(d) were not met; (2) the lack of date and time in the notice to appear (NTA) did not implicate immigration court’s adjudicatory authority; and (3) the date and time for subsequent removal hearing need not be included in NTA to initiate removal proceedings.

Holding that (1) Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies because the BIA had ruled definitively on the sole issue raised in the petition for review, and (2) the Virginia offense of participating in criminal street gang activity, in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-46.2(A), is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.

Permitting Petitioner to allege membership in a particular social group not raised in her opening brief due to her attorney's "poor performance" and holding that the Board committed reversible error by (1) failing to explain why Petitioner's purported particular social group did not pass muster; (2) erroneously requiring that Petitioner establish that she could not reasonably relocate in evaluating the existence of past persecution; and (3) failing to address Petitioner's testimony that she sought the help of police but was turned away in determining government acquiesence.

Holding that the questions of (1) whether the government would acquiesce in torture for the purpose of CAT relief and (2) whether the Petitioner was in the "physical custody" of his father for purpose of derivation of citizenship under the Child Citizenship Act of 2000 are mixed questions of fact and law subject to de novo review by the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Holding that 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) confer on Immigration Judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals the general authority to administratively close cases, and thus the Attorney General's interpretation of those statutory provisions in Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018) was in error.

Holding that (1) the fact that Notice to Appear did not provide time and date of hearing did not deprive the immigration court of jurisdiction over Petitioner's proceedings and (2) Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to reopen based on eligibility for VAWA relief because Petitioner failed to establish that alleged battery was a central reason for his failure to comply with terms of voluntary departure.

Holding that the Immigration Judge did not abuse his discretion or violate due process in denying a continuance after Petitioner retained new counsel, and upholding the Immigration Judge's denial of Petitioner's application for an 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) good faith marriage waiver because (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the agency’s weighing of evidence, (2) the Board applied the correct standard of review, and (3) Petitioner’s evidence failed to satisfy the statutory standard for a good faith marriage.

Holding that the agency legally erred in denying Petitioner CAT relief because it (1) failed to aggregate Petitioner's risk of torture from all three of the entities that Petitioner feared and determine whether that sum exceeded 50% and (2) did not meaningfully engage with or consider country conditions evidence as a whole.

Holding that (1) because the Petitioner was removable based on his commission of an aggravated felony or specific firearm offense, whether Petitioner established, for CAT relief, that the government would acquiesce in his torture is a mixed question of law and fact that falls outside of the Fourth Circuit's jurisdiction and (2) the Immigration Judge’s determination that Petitioner failed to establish government acquiescence is subject to de novo review by the BIA.

Holding that, where the Immigration Judge made an explicit finding that the persecutor's motive was not on account of a protected ground, the issue of persecutor’s motive is a factual finding that the BIA reviews for clear error that does not authorize de novo review at the circuit court. Declining to reach whether Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I&N Dec. 341 (BIA 2010) (extending the “one central reason” standard for asylum to withholding of removal) is legally flawed because the argument was foreclosed by the Immigration Judge's factual finding on the persecutor's motive. Upholding denial of relief under the Convention against Torture because the BIA applied the correct clear error standard of review to the likelihood of torture, a fact-based determination, and the BIA's determination was supported by substantial evidence.