Holding that the BIA did not err when it reversed the IJ's grant of protection under the Convention Against Torture, because Petitioner did not show that she would more likely than not be tortured if returned to El Salvador.
Holding that the IJ and the BIA erred when they found that a lack of physical harm indicated that a Honduran asylum-seeker who had received multiple death threats had not suffered past persecution.
Holding that (1) an IJ requiring an asylum-seeker to produce corroboration of her religion-based claim in the form of an affidavit from her husband was not an abuse of discretion, (2) a Muslim militiaman yelling at the Christian asylum-seeker to stop praying did not constitute past persecution, and (3) the asylum-seeker had demonstrated no well-founded fear of future persecution largely because the Central African Republic is majority Christian. The dissent in this case argues that the agency abused its discretion for several reasons, including failing to consider important country conditions information supporting the asylum-seeker's well-founded fear.
Holding that a Salvadoran non-citizen was not a member of the particular social group, "nuclear family of his ex-girlfriend's daughter," even though he financially provided for the daughter for all of her life, because (1) he is not the biological father of the child and (2) it was widely known in his community that he was not the biological father of the child, thus failing to satisfy the social visibility prong.
Ruling that the proposed particular social group "Honduran women evading rape and extortion" is not legally cognizable because it does not meet the particularity and social visibility requirements.
Ruling that substantial evidence supports the IJ and BIA finding that a Salvadoran non-citizen had failed to establish the requisite nexus for withholding of removal because he did not show that extortion letters from gang members were on account of his status as a former police officer.
Holding that the agency did not adequately explain its factual determinations in denying asylum to an LGBTQ Mexican asylum-seeker because it failed to (1) consider whether there is a pattern or practice of harm against LGBTQ individuals in Mexico rising to the level of persecution and (2) give reasons for discounting record evidence that contradicted its conclusion that the asylum-seeker did not have an objectively reasonable fear of return to Mexico.
Holding that, for purposes of CAT relief, generalized expert and country conditions evidence is insufficient to establish probability of torture and government acquiescence to torture by Salvadoran gangs.
Holding that, pursuant to Mejia v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 573, 584 (4th Cir. 2017) and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), Petitioner, who was subjected to a reinstated order of removal, could not apply for asylum, even though the factual basis for his asylum claim did not exist prior to his removal.
Holding that, for Petitioner's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection, the agency disregarded and distorted important aspects of Petitioner’s testimony in concluding that Salvadoran government was willing and able to protect her from her abuser.