Case Type
  • Amin v. Sessions

    Holding that the immigration judge did not abuse his discretion or violate due process in denying a continuance after Petitioner retained new counsel, and upholding the immigration judge's denial of Petitioner's application for an 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) good faith marriage waiver because (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the agency’s weighing of evidence, (2) the Board applied the correct standard of review, and (3) Petitioner’s evidence failed to satisfy the statutory standard for a good faith marriage.

    Type: Discretionary Relief, Due Process, Procedural, Relief Eligibility
  • Upatcha v. Barr

    Holding that, following remand, the agency properly denied Petitioner's application for an 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) good faith marriage waiver because (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the agency's adverse credibility determination and weighing of evidence, (2) Petitioner failed to submit sufficient evidence to satisfy the statutory standard for a good faith marriage, and (3) the immigration judge did not violate Petitioner's due process rights at the merits hearing.

    Type: Discretionary Relief, Due Process, Relief Eligibility
  • Rodriguez-Arias v. Whitaker

    Holding that the agency legally erred in denying Petitioner CAT relief because it (1) failed to aggregate Petitioner's risk of torture from all three of the entities that Petitioner feared and determine whether that sum exceeded 50%; and (2) did not meaningfully engage with or consider country-conditions evidence as a whole.

    Type: Fear-based, Procedural

    Holding that the immigration judge's adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence; the immigration judge did not err by improperly discounting the Petitioner's corroborating evidence when denying his application for asylum; the immigration judge did not err, on remand, by conducting an additional hearing and taking oral testimony before denying Petitioner's application for asylum; and the immigration judge's determination that the Petitioner did not demonstrate a likelihood that he would be tortured if returned to Bangladesh was supported by substantial evidence.

    Type: Fear-based, Procedural
  • Hercules-Torres v. Whitaker

    Holding that, where the immigration judge made an explicit finding that the persecutor's motive was not on account of a protected ground, the issue of persecutor’s motive is a factual finding that controls the one central reason inquiry for the nexus element under a clear error standard at the BIA that does not authorize de novo review at the circuit court; Declining to review and leaving open whether the BIA precedent in Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I&N Dec. 341 (BIA 2010) (extending the “one central reason” standard applicable to asylum claims to claims for withholding of removal) is legally flawed because the argument was foreclosed by the immigration judge's factual finding on the persecutor's motive; Declining to review denial of relief under the Convention against Torture because the BIA applied the correct clear error standard of review to the likelihood of torture because it is a fact-based determination, and the BIA's determination was supported by substantial evidence.

    Type: Fear-based, Procedural
  • Tairou v. Whitaker

    Holding that the Board of Immigration Appeals abused its discretion in finding that Petitioner was not subjected to past persecution where binding precedent explicitly holds that a threat of death constitutes persecution and recognizing "homosexuals in Benin" as a particular social group.

    Type: Fear-based
  • Sanmartin Prado v. Whitaker

    Upholding the Board of Immigration Appeals’ finding that Maryland second-degree child abuse pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-601(a)(2), (d) is categorically a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).

    Type: Criminal-Immigration Consequences
  • Cruz-Quintanilla v. Whitaker

    Holding that (1) because the Petitioner was removable based on his commission of an aggravated felony or specific firearm offense, whether Petitioner established, for CAT relief, that the government would acquiesce in his torture is a mixed question of law and fact that falls outside of the Fourth Circuit's jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) and (2) the immigration judge’s determination that Petitioner failed to establish government acquiescence is subject to de novo review, rather than clear error review, by the BIA.

    Type: Criminal-Immigration Consequences, Fear-based, Procedural
  • Martinez v. Sessions

    Holding that Maryland consolidated theft, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 7-104, is not a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) because it punishes de minimis, or minor, takings and is indivisible.

    Type: Criminal-Immigration Consequences

    Holding that the imposition of $100 in court costs, assessed attendant to a prayer for judgment continued under North Carolina law, does not qualify as penalty or punishment to constitute a “conviction” within the meaning of the Immigration and Naturalization Act under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). The Court therefore held that, because the offense in question did not constitute a conviction under immigration law, it did not statutorily bar the Petitioner from cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents.

    Type: Criminal-Immigration Consequences, Relief Eligibility

    Holding that the Board of Immigration Appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying (1) Petitioner's motion to reconsider the conclusion that Petitioner had abandoned her status as a lawful permanent resident based on her extended trips to her home country and (2) Petitioner's motion to reopen because the evidence Petitioner sought to present could have been previously presented and would not have changed the outcome of the case.

    Type: Motions to Reopen, Procedural

    Holding that substantial evidence did not support the Board of Immigration Appeals' determination that the government had established a fundamental change in circumstances to rebut the Petitioner's well-founded fear of persecution for asylum and withholding of removal, and that the agency erred in placing the burden on Petitioner to prove that he could not avoid future persecution through internal relocation, rather than the government to show that he could avoid future persecution by relocating.

    Type: Fear-based, Procedural