Holding that (1) when expedited removal is alleged to be an element in a criminal prosecution under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, the defendant must, as a matter of due process, be able to challenge the element if he did not have a prior opportunity to do so, and thus the jurisdiction-stripping provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(D) is unconstitutional, but (2) the Defendant in the instant case failed to establish that the expedited removal procedure was fundamentally unfair because he did not demonstrate prejudice.
Vacating and remanding BIA's determination that Maryland conviction for a fourth degree sex offense under Md. § 3-308(b)(1) was a crime involving moral turpitude because the BIA's decision relied on Matter of Jimenez-Cedillo, which had been overruled at the time.
Holding that the Maryland offense of conspiracy to distribute a controlled dangerous substance is divisible; as such, the IJ and the BIA properly utilized the modified categorical approach to find that a noncitizen's conviction constituted a controlled substance offense that rendered him removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
Holding that the BIA did not err in concluding that Petitioner's felony failure to appear conviction under Virginia Code § 19.2-128(B) constitutes an aggravated felony, which rendered him deportable.
Holding that Petitioner's South Carolina domestic violence conviction constitutes a crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. § 16(a) and thus rendered him ineligible for cancellation of removal.
Holding that a non-citizen's conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) constitutes clear and convincing evidence that he engaged in alien smuggling, thus rendering him removable because he was inadmissible at the time of his adjustment to LPR status, and ineligible for an INA § 237(a)(1)(H) waiver of inadmissibility.
Holding that (1) Petitioner administratively exhausted issue of whether offense was a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) despite making more nuanced points and citing new cases for the first time on petition for review and (2) Virginia obstruction of justice pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 18.2- 460(A) does not constitute a CIMT because it does not categorically involve turpitudinous conduct, and (3) ordering Government to facilitate Petitioner's return to the United States to restore him to his pre-removal status and effectuate judicial review.
Ruling that Board erred in concluding that Maryland sexual solicitation of a minor, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-324, is a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), where, after Petitioner pled guilty to the offense, the Board reversed its prior precedent to hold that offense was a CIMT without acknowledging or explaining its change in position.
Holding that (1) Petitioner's conviction for conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of New Jersey's general conspiracy statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:5-2, constituted a federal controlled substance offense, which rendered Petitioner inadmissible, (2) the Board was permitted to consider Petitioner's indictment as evidence of his conviction, and (3) Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's unexhausted argument that DHS did not carry its burden of establishing removability because the indictment considered by the Board was not the indictment to which he pled guilty.
Holding that, in proving Petitioner's removability based on his commission of a crime involving moral turpitude within five years of his admission to the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had the burden of affirmatively establishing date of Petitioner's admission by clear and convincing evidence, and DHS failed to establish that Petitioner committed crime within five years of his admission.