Holding that a non-citizen's conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) constitutes clear and convincing evidence that he engaged in alien smuggling, thus rendering him removable because he was inadmissible at the time of his adjustment to LPR status, and ineligible for an INA § 237(a)(1)(H) waiver of inadmissibility.
Holding that, pursuant to Mejia v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 573, 584 (4th Cir. 2017) and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), Petitioner, who was subjected to a reinstated order of removal, could not apply for asylum, even though the factual basis for his asylum claim did not exist prior to his removal.
On rehearing en banc, pursuant to Administrative Procedure Act (APA) review, overturning USCIS's interpretation of the special immigrant juvenile status (SIJS) provision to require a permanent custody order on the basis that such interpretation was not entitled to deference, defied the plain statutory language, and impermissibly intruded into issues of state domestic relations law. Judge Quattlebaum wrote a dissenting opinion.
Holding that (1) Petitioner's Tennessee conviction for unlawful possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of Tenn. Code § 39-17-417, constitutes both an aggravated felony and a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) and Court thus lacked jurisdiction to review BIA's denial of Petitioner's motion to reopen, (2) Petitioner was ineligible for § 212(c) waiver because one of the CIMT convictions that rendered him removable occurred after the repeal of § 212(c), and (3) Petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal for LPRs due to aggravated felony conviction.
Holding that because Petitioner's record of conviction was inconclusive as to whether his 1985 conviction for “sell[ing]/furnish[ing]/etc. marijuana, hash” in violation of Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11360(a) (West 1975) constituted an aggravated felony, he failed to establish eligibility for special rule cancellation of removal under NACARA.
Holding that (1) the BIA's determination that Petitioner was ineligible for asylum and withholding because he failed to show nexus between his past harm and membership in the proposed PSGs of "witnesses of crimes committed by the Zetas" and family of his brother was not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the BIA erred when it found that Petitioner could safely relocate within Guatemala; and (3) the BIA must reconsider the government acquiescence element of Petitioner's CAT claim in light of recent Fourth Circuit precedent.
Holding that, following remand, the agency properly denied Petitioner's application for an INA § 216a(c)(4)(B) good faith marriage waiver because (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the agency's adverse credibility determination and weighing of evidence, (2) Petitioner failed to submit sufficient evidence to satisfy the statutory standard for a good faith marriage, and (3) the Immigration Judge did not violate Petitioner's due process rights at the merits hearing.
Holding that the Immigration Judge did not abuse his discretion or violate due process in denying a continuance after Petitioner retained new counsel, and upholding the Immigration Judge's denial of Petitioner's application for an 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) good faith marriage waiver because (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the agency’s weighing of evidence, (2) the Board applied the correct standard of review, and (3) Petitioner’s evidence failed to satisfy the statutory standard for a good faith marriage.
Holding that the imposition of $100 in court costs, assessed attendant to a prayer for judgment continued under North Carolina law, does not qualify as a penalty or punishment to constitute a “conviction” within the meaning of the Immigration and Naturalization Act under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) and thus, Petitioner was not statutorily barred from cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents.