Rejecting Petitioner's challenge to reinstatement of his prior removal order because, although there was no IJ removal order in the record, there was ample other evidence in the record to support a finding that the Petitioner had been ordered removed to Honduras in 2009, including fingerprint data that DHS proffered but did not enter into evidence.
Holding that USCIS did not abuse its discretion when it denied a Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS) application because the applicant provided a temporary rather than a permanent custody order that did not reflect the state court's factual findings, even though the applicant later submitted a second permanent custody order that complied with USCIS requirements.
Holding that the agency abused its discretion when it failed to consider all of the In re Hashmi factors in denying a non-citizen's motion for a continuance due to DHS's delay in adjudicating an I-130 petition filed by the non-citizen's husband.
Holding that the agency did not adequately explain its factual determinations in denying asylum to an LGBTQ Mexican asylum-seeker because it failed to (1) consider whether there is a pattern or practice of harm against LGBTQ individuals in Mexico rising to the level of persecution and (2) give reasons for discounting record evidence that contradicted its conclusion that the asylum-seeker did not have an objectively reasonable fear of return to Mexico.
Declining to apply full exclusionary rule to immigration proceedings and upholding agency's denial of Petitioner's motion to suppress statements he made to police officers and ICE agents admitting that he was without status because Petitioner failed to establish an egregious Fourth Amendment or due process violation.
Holding that (1) Petitioner administratively exhausted issue of whether offense was a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) despite making more nuanced points and citing new cases for the first time on petition for review and (2) Virginia obstruction of justice pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 18.2- 460(A) does not constitute a CIMT because it does not categorically involve turpitudinous conduct, and (3) ordering Government to facilitate Petitioner's return to the United States to restore him to his pre-removal status and effectuate judicial review.
Ruling that Board erred in concluding that Maryland sexual solicitation of a minor, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-324, is a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), where, after Petitioner pled guilty to the offense, the Board reversed its prior precedent to hold that offense was a CIMT without acknowledging or explaining its change in position.
Ruling that (1) for withholding of removal, Petitioner’s family relationship was a central reason for Petitioner's persecution, which resulted from Petitioner's stepfather’s actions to protect family from gang, (2) remand was required to consider whether, pursuant to Zambrano v. Sessions, 878 F.3d 84 (4th Cir. 2017), Petitioner demonstrated changed circumstances in the form of the intensification of a preexisting threat of persecution to excuse the untimeliness of his asylum application, and (3) substantial evidence supported the agency's denial of CAT relief.
Holding that, in proving Petitioner's removability based on his commission of a crime involving moral turpitude within five years of his admission to the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had the burden of affirmatively establishing date of Petitioner's admission by clear and convincing evidence, and DHS failed to establish that Petitioner committed crime within five years of his admission.
Holding that (1) Petitioner's Tennessee conviction for unlawful possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of Tenn. Code § 39-17-417, constitutes both an aggravated felony and a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) and Court thus lacked jurisdiction to review BIA's denial of Petitioner's motion to reopen, (2) Petitioner was ineligible for § 212(c) waiver because one of the CIMT convictions that rendered him removable occurred after the repeal of § 212(c), and (3) Petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal for LPRs due to aggravated felony conviction.